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Our past studies have led us to divide sensory experiences, including aesthetic ones
derived from sensory sources, into two broad categories: biological and artifactual. The
aesthetic experience of biological beauty is dictated by inherited brain concepts, which
are resistant to change even in spite of extensive experience. The experience of artifactual
beauty on the other hand is determined by post-natally acquired concepts, which are
modifiable throughout life by exposure to different experiences (Zeki, 2009; Zeki and
Chén, 2016). Hence, in terms of aesthetic rating, biological beauty (in which we include
the experience of beautiful faces or human bodies) is characterized by less variability
between individuals belonging to different ethnic origins and cultural backgrounds or the
same individual at different times. Artifactual beauty (in which we include the aesthetic
experience of human artifacts, such as buildings and cars) is characterized by greater
variability between individuals belonging to different ethnic and cultural groupings and
by the same individual at different times. In this paper, we present results to show that
the experience of mathematical beauty (Zeki et al., 2014), even though it constitutes an
extreme example of beauty that is dependent upon (mathematical) culture and learning,
is consistent with one of the characteristics of the biological categories, namely a lesser
variability in terms of the aesthetic ratings given to mathematical formulae experienced
as beautiful.
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INTRODUCTION
In an earlier study (Zeki et al., 2014), we reported that the experience of mathematical beauty (by
mathematicians) correlated with activity in field A1 of the medial orbito-frontal cortex (A1mOFC);
moreover, the intensity of activity there was parametrically related to the declared intensity of the
beauty experienced by the mathematicians when viewing the mathematical formulae. This was a
somewhat surprising result, at least to us. The experience of mathematical beauty is derived from a
highly intellectual, cognitive source; it is indeed this very source and its preoccupation with eternal
and immutable truths that led Plato (1961a,b) to consider mathematical beauty as the highest form
of beauty. It is also themost extreme example of aesthetic experience that is dependent upon culture
and learning. Unlike visual or musical beauty, only those versed in mathematics can experience the
beauty of mathematical formulations. And yet the experience of mathematical beauty correlates
with activity in the same part of the emotional brain as the experience of beauty derived from
sensory sources, such as the visual or the musical (Ishizu and Zeki, 2011). This naturally leads
one to enquire further into the nature and classification of mathematical beauty. We have in the
past classified sensory experiences in general, including aesthetic ones, into two broad categories,
biological and artifactual (Zeki, 2009; Zeki and Chén, 2016); the former are interfaced through
inherited brain concepts and are less dependent on culture and learning than the latter, which
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are interfaced through acquired concepts that are modifiable
throughout post-natal life through exposure to new experiences.
In particular, we posited that experiences regulated by inherited
biological concepts are more widely shared and less variable than
ones regulated by acquired concepts. There is some evidence
to support this classification (Chén and Zeki, 2011), which,
in outline, has also been confirmed by recent results on the
experience of beauty derived from sensory visual sources (Vessel
et al., 2018). The question that we address here is which category
mathematical beauty belongs to, given that it is an experience that
is heavily dependent upon learning and culture on the one hand
but which requires unanimity for its validity on the other.
We therefore wanted to add to our previous study of the
experience of mathematical beauty by analyzing our results
further, with the following questions in mind: what was the
degree of variability in the ratings given to equations that
had been rated as beautiful and did that variability differ in
any significant way from the variability in the “non-beautiful”
ratings that had been assigned to other equations? Our only
hypothesis in this regard was that, if mathematical beauty belongs
to the biological category, then there should be significantly
less variability among equations given high ratings than among
others. We indeed found this to be the case, which reinforced
our view that mathematical beauty belongs to the category of
biological beauty, for reasons which we have explored before
(Zeki et al., 2014) and explore more fully here in the Discussion
section.
MATERIAL AND METHODS
A full description of the subjects and methods used to rate
mathematical equations is given in Zeki et al. (2014), where all the
60 mathematical formulae used in the study are also tabulated.
The ratings used appear in Data Sheet 3 of the supplemental
data in Table 1 (pre-scan beauty ratings) and 6 (post-scan
understanding ratings) of Zeki et al. (2014).
In brief, 15 mathematicians (three females, in the age range
of 22–32 years) and all of them post-graduate students or post-
doctoral fellows in mathematics took part in the study. Each
was given the 60 mathematical equations to study at leisure and
rate according to the aesthetic experience aroused in them on
a scale of −5 (ugly) to +5 (beautiful). Subsequent to a brain
scanning experiment, to determine the brain areas in which
activity correlates with the experience of mathematical beauty
(the results of which are reported in Zeki et al., 2014), each subject
was asked to report their level of understanding of each equation
on a scale of 0 (no understanding) to 3 (profound understanding)
and to report their emotional reactions to the equations. In this
paper we use the pre-scan beauty ratings from our earlier study
(Zeki et al., 2014); these were scored on an 11-point scale of−5 to
+5, unlike the scan-time beauty ratings, which were rated on a 3-
point scale of−1/0/+1. We also use the post-scan understanding
ratings (0–3).
As for comparison, we asked 12 controls (i.e.,
non-mathematicians) to give beauty and understanding
ratings to the same equations, exactly as for the mathematicians
(see Zeki et al., 2014). The majority gave an understanding rating
of 0 to most equations, with some giving positive beauty ratings
to a minority of the equations. One subject did not give beauty
ratings to any of the equations and rated all 0’s for understanding,
effectively leaving us with 11 subjects as controls. Overall, of the
720 equations distributed over the non-mathematical subjects,
645 (89.6%) were given a 0 rating (no understanding), 49
(6.8%) were given a rating of 1 (vague understanding) and the
remainder were rated as 2 (good understanding) or 3 (profound
comprehension). The majority (9 out of 12) gave a negative
response to the question: “When you consider a particularly
beautiful equation, do you experience an emotional response?”
Given this, we hypothesized that, when such non-mathematical
subjects gave a positive beauty rating to the equations, they
were doing so on a formal basis; that is to say, on how attractive
the form of the equations was to them. Even so, the results in
Figure 2 show that there was no uniformity among controls for




In our statistical analyses of the results we use the following
notations:
Let rij denote the beauty rating that the i
th subject gives to
the jth formula; let uij denote individual i’s understanding of
the jth formula; let N denote the total number of subjects; let
xj :=
∑N






/(N − 1) be the mean
beauty rating (m-BR) and standard deviation of beauty ratings
(sd-BR), given to the jth formula across subjects, respectively;
let µj :=
∑N






/(N − 1) be the
mean understanding rating of the formula (m-UR) and standard
deviation of the understanding rating (sd-UR), given to the jth
formula across subjects, respectively.
We undertook the following statistical analyses on the ratings.
1. We first normalized the beauty rating scores for each
subject, following which the ratings from each subject were
centered at 0 with a standard deviation of 1. The intra-class
(between subject) correlation coefficient (ICC) for ratings
across subjects became −0.02, indicating that there was no
tendency for subjects to systematically give all equations
higher or lower ratings (see Figure 1A). In other words, the
source of variability in beauty ratings (see Figure 1B) must be
either specific to the equations, or to another linked source
(e.g., variability in the understanding of the equations), but
unlikely to be due to between-subject variability. Similarly,
we normalized the understanding scores for each subject, to
obtain similar scales for the beauty and the understanding
ratings; this gave an ICC=−0.02.
2. We calculated the m-BR and the sd-BR (i.e., the mean and
standard deviation of the normalized beauty ratings) as well
as the m-UR and sd-UR (mean and standard deviation of the
normalized understanding ratings), for each formula across
subjects. This gave 60 m-BR values with 60 corresponding sd-
BR values, and 60 m-UR values with 60 corresponding sd-UR
values. Although the range for beauty ratings was from −5 to
5, and that for understanding was from 0 to 3, the ranges for
m-BR and m-UR, after normalization, are (−1.36, 1.07) and
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(−1.31, 1.08), respectively. Therefore, we removed, through
normalization, confounding effects that can be caused by a
difference in the ratings’ original scales. For simplicity, data
analyses were all conducted using normalized data, and we
therefore omit the term normalized below.
3. We plotted the m-BR values against the sd-BR values for both
mathematicians and non-mathematicians (see Figure 2). The
graph for the mathematicians (left) has a pronounced negative
trend, showing that there was generally a lower standard
deviation for formulae rated as beautiful compared to ones not
rated as beautiful (Pearson r: −0.55, p < 10−5). In simpler
terms, there was a higher consensus among our sample of
15 subjects regarding beautiful equations than about the not
beautiful ones since, unlike the equations rated as beautiful,
FIGURE 1 | (A) Normalized ratings against subjects. The distribution of the normalized ratings for each subject is approximately Gaussian with a mean of 0 and a
standard deviation of 1. (B) Normalized ratings against equations. The ratings for each equation are represented by a box plot; the horizontal line within each box plot
represents the median of the ratings and the vertical lines represents the first and the last quartile of the ratings, respectively, while the box itself represents the middle
50% of the ratings. Dots represent outlier ratings.
FIGURE 2 | Left: A plot of the mean pre-scan beauty rating (m-BR) for each equation against the standard deviation (sd-BR) of the ratings given to each equation for
mathematicians (Pearson r: −0.55, p < 10−5). Right: The same plot for non-mathematicians (Pearson r: −0.10, p > 0.05). Each circle corresponds to one equation;
its value on the horizontal line indicates the average beauty ratings of the equation across all subjects and its value on the vertical line indicates the standard deviation
of the beauty ratings. Gray area indicates the 95% confidence band for best-fit line.
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there was greater variability for those rated as not beautiful.
This is the primary finding reported here.
In contrast, the graph relating the m-BR to the sd-BR for the
controls (non-mathematicians) (right in Figure 2) is nearly flat
and shows no significant correlation between the two ratings.
Therefore, unless otherwise specified, in the following we focus
on inquiring into the relationship of m-BR, sd-BR, and potential
confounds only among mathematicians.
Possible Confounds Due to Understanding
Rating
Although there is a significant relationship between m-BR and
sd-BR, there also exists a possible confound since we know of
(and might reasonably expect) a positive correlation between
the mean beauty ratings and the mean understanding ratings of
the equations. Thus, the relationship between m-BR and sd-BR
might primarily be due to the understanding rating rather than
the beauty rating. Figure 3 depicts the correlations between the
beauty and understanding ratings and other confounds. In the
following, we conduct further analyses to rule out any influence
of the understanding ratings on the beauty ratings.
1. We investigate first the linear relationship between the m-
BR and the sd-BR across equations. Formally, consider the
equation
yj = β0 + β1xj + εj, 1 ≤ j ≤ 60 (1)
FIGURE 3 | A schematic representation of the association between mean
beauty ratings (m-BR), mean understanding ratings (m-UR), the standard
deviation of understanding ratings (sd-UR) and standard deviations of beauty
ratings (sd-BR). The thickness of the connecting lines denotes the pairwise
Pearson correlations between them. We show below that although there is an
association between m-BR and m-UR, there is no association between m-UR
and sd-BR. Moreover, adding m-UR to m-BR does not improve the
established association between m-BR and sd-BR.
where xj and yj refer to the m-BR and the sd-BR of the j
th
equation, β0 and β1 are parameters for the intercept and slope,
and εj indicates the residual term (i.e., the information not
explained). Our data shows that the estimate for β1, or βˆ1 =
−0.21 (p < 10−5). In other words, if a formula is on average
rated one point higher than a second formula, the standard
deviation of the ratings across subjects (which quantifies the
disagreement among subjects) for the former formula is 0.21
units less than the standard deviation of the ratings for the
latter formula. More simply stated, this means that where
there is a higher beauty rating for a mathematical formula,
there is less variation in the rating among individuals.
2. Although a low sd-BR is significantly associated with a highm-
BR (themore beautifully rated formulae have smaller standard
deviations), it remained possible that these are confounded
by subjects’ understanding of the mathematical formulae. To
check for confounds, we reran Model (1), where the regressor
xj (the m-BR of formula j) was replaced with µj (the m-UR of
formula j) (see Figure 4). Our data showed that the m-UR is
not significantly associated with the sd-BR (Pearson r: −0.24,
p> 0.05).
3. So far, we have shown that the m-UR was not significantly
associated with the sd-BR; the possibility remains, however,
that the m-UR and the m-BR may jointly affect the sd-BR.
We therefore ran tests to learn if adding the m-UR to the m-
BR would give a better account of the variability in sd-BR.
Formally, using an F-test, we compared Model (1) with the
following model
yj = β0 + β1xj + β2µj + ej, 1 ≤ j ≤ 60 (2)
FIGURE 4 | A graph relating the standard deviation of the pre-scan beauty
ratings (sd-BR) against mean understanding ratings (m-UR) for each equation
(Pearson r: −0.24, p > 0.05). Conventions as in Figure 2.
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where µj denotes the m-UR of the j
th formula, and
ej indicates the residual term. The F-test can be used
for determining whether a “more complicated” model with
additional parameters [e.g., Model (2)] is significantly better
than a baseline model [e.g., Model (1)].
The F-test statistic is defined as F = (RSS1−RSS2)/(df1−df2)
RSS2/df2
,
where RSS1 and RSS2 denote residual sums of squares for
Models (1) and (2), respectively, and df1 and df2 denote
degrees of freedom (i.e., number of data points minus number
of parameters) for Models (1) and (2), respectively (Fisher,
1925; Ott and Michael, 1980; Bickel and Doksum, 2000).
Using this test, we show that adding the m-UR (mean
understanding rating, µ) in Model (2) does not significantly
reduce prediction errors in Model (1) (F = 0.04, p = 0.84)
and therefore does not add additional information to the
established association between the sd-BR (y) and the m-BR
(x) in Model (1).
4. Taken together, our analyses show that high mean beauty
rating of formulas in a population is significantly (negatively)
associated with the standard deviation of the beauty ratings.
Specifically, one unit increase of mean rating leads to −0.21
units decrease of standard deviation of a formula. Further,
such association is neither due to, nor can be further explained
by, one’s understanding of the formulas, suggesting that
there is a unified aesthetical appreciation of mathematics
among individuals, and that such aesthetic appreciation
is separate from one’s understanding of the mathematical
formulae.
Possible Ceiling Effect
Since the beauty rating scales were from −5 to 5, it is possible
that there was a ceiling effect for those equations that were rated
either −5 or 5. In other words, were the scale changed to −10
to 10, some of those equations that were rated 5 and −5 on
our scale of −5 to 5 may have been rated lower than −5 or
higher than 5. If so, then the ceiling effect could have potentially
reduced the variance of the highly (or lowly) rated equations,
thus confounding our results. Although normalization reduces
the ceiling effect, it could still be argued that the results would
be different (and possibly insignificant) were the ratings on a
different scale, even with normalization. We therefore conducted
simulation studies to learn whether such a ceiling effect, even if it
exists in our studies, would modify our conclusion.
1. The likelihood of a ceiling effect for ratings between −4 and
4 is low, because one can always choose a higher (i.e., 5) or
lower (i.e., −5) rating. Thus, we focused on addressing the
potential ceiling effect with regards to ratings of 5 and −5.
The first set of simulations was conducted as follows: for any
equation that was rated 5, we simulated a positive integer and
added it to 5. Similarly, for any equation that was rated−5, we
simulated another positive integer and subtracted it from −5.
Each equation-specific integerK was simulated from a Poisson
distribution with P
(
K = k) = e−λ λk
k!
, where λ = 1. We
chose a Poisson distribution because it generates non-negative
integers, so the resulting numbers are still valid integer ratings;
we set parameter λ = 1 because the data thus simulated
approximates a scenario with a relatively serious ceiling effect,
i.e., it simulates a (worst case) situation where there is a 63.15%
chance of having a ceiling effect. Where there was a ceiling
effect with this procedure we added (or subtracted) 1 to 5
points to a rating of 5 (or from a rating of −5) according to
the above probability distribution. There was a 99.94% chance
that the added or subtracted integers were less than, or equal,
to 5, thereby placing the majority of the final ratings between
−10 and 10; there was a 0.06% chance that the added (or
subtracted) integers were>5, simulating a real world scenario
where a subject could possibly have wanted to rate a formula
beyond the range of 10 to −10, that is to say well outside the
prescribed limits of−5 to 5.
2. We repeated the above simulation study 10,000 times, in
each of which different randomly simulated non-negative
integers were added to (or subtracted from) 5’s (or −5’s). The
95% confidence interval for the 10,000 Pearson correlations
between the simulated sd-BR and m-BR ranged from
−0.420 to −0.419, and the 95% confidence interval for the
corresponding p-values fell between 1.5×10−3 and 1.6×10−3
(see Figure 5).
3. Taken together, even if there was a ceiling effect, the
significant association between sd-BR and m-BR still exists;
this conclusion is based on extensive simulations, where
serious ceiling effects were considered for the original rating
data.
DISCUSSION
That the experience of mathematical beauty (Zeki et al., 2014)
correlates with activity in the same part of the emotional brain,
namely A1mOFC, as the experience of beauty derived from other
FIGURE 5 | The results from simulation studies. The histogram represents
10,000 correlations between the mean beauty ratings (m-BR) and the
standard deviation of the beauty ratings (sd-BR), analyzed by Pearson’s test.
During each simulation, non-negative integers generated from a Poisson
distribution were added to (or subtracted from) the original ratings of 5 (or −5).
The 95% confidence interval for the distribution is (−0.420, −0.419).
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TABLE 1 | The five equations (out of 60) given the top ratings (on a scale of −5 to +5) are shown in the upper section while those given the lowest ratings are shown
below.
# Equation Description Mean rating
1 1+ eipi = 0 Euler’s identity links five fundamental mathematical constants with three basic
arithmetic operations each occurring once.
3.6000
2 cos2 θ + sin2 θ = 1 The Pythagorean identity, which states that for any angle, the square of the sine plus
the square of the cosine is 1.
3.2667
54 ∂u
∂x = ∂v∂y , ∂u∂y = − ∂v∂x Cauchy-Riemann equations are a system of two partial differential equations which
must be satisfied if a complex function is complex differentiable.
3.1333
5 eix = cos x + i sin x Identity between exponential and trigonometric functions derivable from Euler’s






dx = √pi Definite Gaussian integral-ubiquitous in mathematical physics. 2.9333
. . .
39 |∅| = 0 The cardinality of the empty set is zero. −0.4000
51 UC = ∅ The complement of the universal set is the empty set. −0.5333
15 1729 = 13 + 123 = 93 + 103 The smallest number expressible as the sum of two cubes in two different ways. −1.1333
28 32 + 42 = 52 Pythagoras’ theorem for a 3:4:5 triangle. −1.1333








Equation expressing the inverse value of pi as an infinite sum. −1.8000
sources, including sensory and moral ones (Ishizu and Zeki,
2011), raises the question of how to classify mathematical beauty.
We have in the past suggested that the classification of
experiences, ranging from ordinary sensory ones, such as that
of color, to aesthetic experiences, such as that of beauty, can
be subdivided into two broad categories (Zeki, 2009; Zeki and
Chén, 2016), a categorization that finds confirmation in recent
psychophysical studies (Vessel et al., 2018). At one end are
experiences belonging to the biological category: these have a
biologically inherited brain concept as a basis (Zeki, 2009). Such
biological concepts lead to experiences that are shared universally
by all ethnic groups and are independent of learning. Moreover,
they are not easilymodifiable by experiment or repeated exposure
to a variant that departs significantly from the inherited concept,
at least within the limits tested (see Chén and Zeki, 2011). This
entitles a subject having an aesthetic experience which belongs
in the biological category and determined by an inherited brain
concept to suppose that the experience is similar to the one
that others would have in similar circumstances and that it
has, therefore, universal validity and assent (see also Zeki and
Chén, 2016). A prime example of this is in the experience
of color categories. The colors of objects and surfaces remain
constant in spite of wide fluctuations in the wavelength-energy
composition of the light reflected off them (Land, 1974). This
phenomenon is generally referred to as color constancy although
we much prefer the term constant color categories (see Zeki
et al., 2017). This is because, although the color category does
not change with such fluctuations, the exact hue (shade of color)
of a patch belonging to a given color category will do so. The
generation of constant color categories is due, we suppose, to an
inherited brain program which compares the wavelength-energy
composition of light coming from one patch with that coming
from surrounding patches, thus generating ratios between the
two for every waveband (Land, 1974), with the ratios remaining
constant in spite of significant changes in the amounts of
light of different wavebands reflected from the viewed patch
and its surrounds. In fact, psychophysical experiments that we
have undertaken (in preparation) demonstrate that there is very
little variability among humans of different ethnic and cultural
backgrounds when asked to assign the color of patches (which are
reflecting light of the same wavelength-energy composition) to a
standard set of colored chips. This is because, due to an inherited
brain program for generating constant color categories, the
patches maintain their color categories even with wide variations
in the wavelength-energy composition of the light reflected from
them. Hence humans can (and do) suppose that others have a
similar color experience to them and that their experience has,
therefore, universal, assent.1
At the other end are experiences determined by acquired
brain concepts, examples being that of man-made artifacts
consisting of a variety of manufactured goods. The concept
underlying these experiences are acquired post-natally and are
modifiable throughout post-natal life (Zeki, 2009), which can
be demonstrated experimentally (Chén and Zeki, 2011). Because
they are based on individual experience and experimentation,
the experiencing subject cannot assume that others will have the
same experience. As an example, someone who is brought up
in a particular environment, say a Western one, cannot assume
that another human from a different cultural environment will
find the same satisfaction in manufactured goods from Western
culture (in this category, we include such items as planes, cars,
forks and knives, etc.). Moreover, since the brain concept itself
is acquired post-natally and changes with new experiences,
one cannot even assume that an aesthetic judgment on the
architectural merit of a building made today will be the same as
1When we speak of similar color experiences, we restrict ourselves to saying that
different humans do not differ when assigning different colored patches, surfaces
or objects to chips belonging to different color categories. In saying so, we do not
address the vexed question of color qualia.
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the one made in the past or that will be made in the future (Zeki
and Chén, 2016).
The Categorization of Mathematical
Beauty
This naturally raises the awkward question of whether the
experience of mathematical beauty belongs in the biological or
the artifactual category.
The experience of mathematical beauty is perhaps the most
extreme aesthetic experience that is dependent upon culture and
learning; those not versed in the language of mathematics cannot
experience the beauty of a mathematical formulation. And yet,
once the language of mathematics is mastered, the same formulae
can be experienced as beautiful by mathematicians belonging to
different races and cultures. Indeed, Paul Dirac coined the term
“the principle ofmathematical beauty” (Farmelo, 2011) andmade
the beauty of a mathematical formula, rather than its simplicity,
the ultimate guide to its truthfulness (Dirac, 1939). He was not
alone; other mathematicians, such as Hermann Weyl and Paul
Erdös, thought similarly.
In what does the beauty of a mathematical formula lie? We
gave thought to the possibility that the beauty ratings given to our
mathematical equations had “low-level” sensory sources, such as
curvatures, the position and number of elements, symmetry, and
so on. Although this remains a remote possibility, we discount
it and Table 1 below shows why. In that Table, we show the five
formulae given the highest ratings and the five given the lowest
ratings. The spatial characteristics (e.g., size, height, number of
elements, symbols or symmetry) of the equations are broadly
equivalent and the possibility that such factors, rather than the
cognitive beauty, played a role in the ratings seems unlikely to
us. Moreover, if the ratings were made on the basis of formal
qualities, one might have expected some unanimity among the
non-mathematicians as well. But the graph relating m-BR to sd-
BR in our control group of non-mathematicians (see Figure 2,
right) shows no consistent relation between the various formal
characteristics of the formulae given in Table 1 and the ratings.
This reinforces our view that such characteristics probably played
no role in the ratings, while acknowledging the possibility that
they may yet be shown to play a role.
The Determinants of Mathematical Beauty
Perhaps the most forceful way of accounting for the experience
of mathematical beauty, and the one nearest to our belief, comes
from Immanuel Kant on the one hand and Bertrand Russell on
the other. Kant’s views are opaque and difficult to understand,
and his use of the term “intuition” especially vague. For an
interpretation of what constitutes mathematical beauty for Kant
we rely on Breitenbach’s (2015) discussion. For Kant, it seems, a
mathematical formulation is beautiful if it “makes sense.” This, of
course, raises the question of “makes sense” to what. We believe
that at least part of the experienced beauty of a mathematical
formulation lies in the fact that it adheres to the logical deductive
system of the brain, which is similar in individuals of all races and
cultures, and hence makes sense in terms of that logical deductive
system. This is clearly stated by Russell (1920) in his Introduction
to Mathematical Philosophy. Although he makes no reference to
the brain, Russell implicitly equates mathematics with the brain’s
logical deductive system when he asks “What is this subject, which
may be called indifferently either mathematics or logic?” because,
to him, “What can be known, inmathematics and bymathematical
methods, is what can be deduced from pure logic” since “logic is the
youth of mathematics and mathematics is the manhood of logic.”
Perhaps most significantly for our argument, to Russell “Logical
propositions are such as can be known a priori, without study of the
actual world.” In other words, logical propositions can be traced
to inherited brain concepts.
The implication of the statements made by Russell and others
quoted above can be taken to mean that there is a biological
basis to mathematical logic and, by extension, a biological basis
to the experience of mathematical beauty. Our results are not
inconsistent with such a supposition; but we are anxious to
emphasize that they are merely suggestive in that direction and
that we cannot assert, through them alone, that mathematical
beauty is incontrovertibly biological in nature. Rather, we believe
that our work, reported here, opens a new and useful discourse
on the roots of mathematical beauty and how it can be studied
and quantified.
The logical deductive system of the brain, whatever its details,
is inherited and is therefore similar in mathematicians belonging
otherwise to different races and cultures. It is in this sense that
mathematical beauty has its roots in a biologically inherited
logical-deductive system that is similar for all brains. It is
only by adhering to the rules of the brain’s logical deductive
system that a formulation can gain universal assent and be
found beautiful. Any departure from that would mean that it
has lost the universal agreement. Implicit in our argument is
that the experience of mathematical beauty, being the result
of the application of the brain’s logical-deductive system, is a
demonstration that the logical deductive system of mathematical
brains, no matter what their cultural background may be, is
the same. And since mathematical beauty, in our categorization,
belongs to the biological category, it is not surprising that there
is significantly less variability among mathematicians in rating
mathematical equations as beautiful.
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